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Hardware architecture for trustable vehicular electronic control units
W. Adi,
Published in Association for Computing Machinery
Pages: 437 - 441
Most popular attacks on vehicular systems involve replacing legal by fake physical unit or manipulating existing system elements. Cars incorporate many functional units such as the odometer and maintenance counters, which have to be uniquely identified and supposed to stay manipulation-free for the virtual vehicle lifetime of about 15 years. A novel clone-resisting technology is proposed for vehicular environment. The particular resulting property is that even the participating vehicular manufacturers can hardly clone own fabricated units. A new physical architecture and unit personalization process are implemented in the production scenario such that fair and controllable production license agreements can be enforced. Vehicular production includes many sub-contractors manufacturing sub-units therefore a new multi-identity certification is embedded and linked to a scalable authentication protocol. The identity is kept in a living/dynamic process such that even if a cloning attack was successful at some time point, it would be soon identified for sure in later transactions. This fact is frustrating for system attackers as the attack's costs are too high and the use out of a successful attack becomes negligible. Authentic physical hardware anchor can build the basis for a trustable secured vehicular communication system as indicated in [10] and [11]. A short risk and threat analysis is demonstrating the security stability of the system. © 2009 ACM.
Concepts (3)
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    Clone-resistant identity
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    Vehicular security